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As is well-known from the literature on oligopolistic competition with incomplete in-
formation, firms have an incentive to share private demand information. However, by
assuming verifiability of demand data, these models ignore the possibility of strate-
gic misinformation. We show that if firms can send misleading demand information,
they will do so. Furthermore, we derive a costly signaling mechanism implementing
demand revelation, even without verifiability. For the case of a gamma distribu-
tion of the firms’ demand variables, we prove that the expected gross gains from
information revelation exceed the expected cost of signaling if the skewness of the
distribution is sufficiently large and the products are sufficiently differentiated.
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The strategic interaction of firms is typically characterized by problems of asym-
metric information. Firms are usually better or at least earlier informed about their
own cost and demand parameters than about those of their rivals. Therefore, it is
an important issue in the industrial organization literature to study the incentives
of firms to exchange their private information (see, e.g. Vives 1999, ch. 8). The
literature on information sharing in oligopoly is large. However, most models deal
with Cournot competition in homogeneous markets. Only few papers deal with price
competition in heterogeneous markets, even if this mode of competition seems to be
relevant in most industries. Gal-Or (1986) and Sakai (1991) study the expected gains
of exchanging cost information, while Vives (1984) and Sakai (1986) analyze the ex-
change of demand information. The authors derive the well known result that firms
ex ante have no incentive to share private value cost information but indeed have an
incentive to share private value demand information. These results, summarized in
the rather general duopoly model of Raith (1996), show that the decisive factors for
information sharing include not only the mode of competition (prices or quantities)
but also the kind of private information (common value or private value) and the
relation of the products (substitutes or complements). In some cases, firms ex ante
expect to benefit from sharing information, in other cases the reverse is true.
The cited models have in common that they ignore the problem of strategically
misinforming competitors by assuming that firms can agree to reveal information
as soon as it becomes privately known. As an alternative, they assume an outside
institution, such as a trade association, which transfers true information. The role of
this association is to ensure that no firm can deviate from its precommitment to dis-
close the true information. Such an institution may exist in a regulated environment
but not in a competitive market. Without precommitment, however, the decision to
disclose depends on the realization of the private information. For a large subset of
realizations, firms will prefer not to disclose. Even if firms are willing to report about
their private information, the question arises whether they have an incentive to dis-
close the true value or whether they find it in their best interest to mislead the rivals.
So far, this crucial question has only been addressed by Ziv (1993) in the context
of private value cost information in a homogeneous market with quantity competi-
tion. By introducing a costly two-sided signaling mechanism, Ziv (1993) solves the
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precommitment problem by showing that, if it is not too costly, the firms’ optimal
strategy is to truthfully disclose their private information by sending a message. Of
course, competitors could send no message at all, but if this strategy is interpreted
as the worst possible case, such behavior will certainly be dominated by sending the
true signal.
The intention of the present paper is twofold: First, it complements Ziv’s results by
analyzing the information revelation strategies of firms in case of private demand
information instead of private cost information. Thereby, we generalize the model by
accounting for heterogeneous markets and by allowing not only for quantity but also
for price competition. These extensions prove to be essential since the information
revelation behavior in the sequentially rational equilibrium decisively depends on
the degree of product differentiation. Secondly, we provide a parametric solution for
the condition that firms agree to implement the proposed revelation mechanism.
We show that, depending on mean and variance of the distribution of the demand
variable, the expected gross gains from information revelation exceed the expected
cost of signaling only if the products are sufficiently heterogeneous.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the model
and determines the expected gains from information sharing. Section 3 proves that,
without a signaling mechanism implementing truth telling, firms have no incen-
tive to reveal their private demand information. Section 4 derives a costly signaling
mechanism implementing a truthful exchange of private demand information if the
expected gross gains from information revelation exceed the expected cost of signal-
ing. Section 4 derives the condition under which risk-neutral firms should agree to
implement the proposed signaling device and gives a parametric example by assum-
ing gamma distributed demand variables. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a simultaneous-move game between two firms producing differentiated
products. Each strategy si, i = 1, 2 belongs to the positive real line and the profit
functions πi(si, sj) are twice continuously differentiable. If the decision variables
are prices, the game is one of price competition, if they are quantities, it is one
of quantity competition. To keep the model analytically tractable, we rely on the
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quadratic profit functions
πi(si, sj) = si(ai − si + ksj) , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j ,
where the demand variables ai are independent and identically distributed on the
support [a, a]. To avoid negative quantities or prices for k < 0, we have to assume
that 2a+ka > 0. The parameter k measures the degree of product differentiation. If
k = 0, the price of each variety depends only on the quantity of the variety produced
and vice versa. In the case of quantity competition, the products of the two firms
are substitutes (complements) according to whether k < 0 (k > 0). In the case of
price competition, they are substitutes (complements) for k > 0 (k < 0).
The game consists of three stages. In the first stage, each firm i receives private
information about the realization of its demand parameter ai. In the second stage,
each firm can send a message âi ∈ [a, a] about this parameter. After receiving the
other firm’s message, firms simultaneously compete in quantities or prices in the
third stage of the game. The payoffs are the resulting profits net of the message
cost.
As a benchmark we will first derive the ex ante expected profits of the firms in the
two cases of truthful information sharing and information concealing.1
2.1 Equilibrium with Private Demand Information
If firms conceal their private information, the game is one of static quantity or price
competition with asymmetric demand information and the expected profit of firm i
is
Eiπi = si(ai − si + kEi(sj)) , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j .
Since the firms’ demand variables are assumed to be identically distributed, it is
easy to solve for the firms’ strategies in the Bayesian equilibrium, given their private
demand information. The first-order conditions lead to the equilibrium strategies
si =
(2 − k)ai + kE(a)
2(2 − k) , i = 1, 2 .
1 As Raith (1996) has shown, it is never optimal for a firm to only partially share information by
sending a signal with intermediate noise to the rivals.
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The resulting expected profits are
Eipπ
i =
[(2 − k)ai + kE(a)]2
4(2 − k)2 , i = 1, 2 ,
where the subscript p denotes the case of private information. The ex ante expected
profits, before firms receive their own demand information, are
EEpπ =
1




V (a) , (1)
where V (a) = E(a2) − (E(a))2 denotes the variance of the demand distribution.
2.2 Equilibrium with Truthful Information Sharing
If firms truthfully share demand information, then their Nash-equilibrium strategies
in the third stage are
si =
2ai + kaj
4 − k2 , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j ,






, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j ,
where the subscript s denotes the case of truthful information sharing. If the disclo-
sure of information is anticipated, the ex ante expected profits are
Eπs =
1
(2 − k)2 (E(a))
2 +
4 + k2
(4 − k2)2 V (a) . (2)
The difference ∆ ≡ Eπs − EEpπ indicates whether truthful information sharing
increases the firms’ expected profits at a point in time where their own demand pa-
rameters are still unknown. If firms are risk-neutral they prefer truthful information
sharing to information concealing if δ > 0.
Proposition 1: Before firms have recognized the realization of their demand param-
eters, they strictly prefer truthful information sharing to information concealing,
independent of whether the products are substitutes or complements.
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Proof: From (1) and (2), the difference between the ex ante expected profits is
∆ =
(12 − k2)k2
4(4 − k2)2 V (a) > 0 ∀ |k| ∈ (0, 1] . (3)
Of course, if the decision variables si are strategically independent, i.e. k = 0, there is
no gain from information sharing. If they are either strategic substitutes or comple-
ments, however, firms strictly prefer a truthful information transfer to a concealment
of information. The expected gains are increasing in variance V (a) and in the sub-
stitution parameter |k|. The maximum expected gains can be realized for the values
k = 1 (including the case of price competition for market shares) and k = −1
(including the case of Cournot competition).
3 The Truth-Telling Problem
The preceding analysis of the expected gains from information sharing holds at a
point in time where firms do not yet know the realization of their own demand
variables. Once they receive private demand information, however, their incentives
to share information disappear.
To demonstrate this effect, we now assume that each firm, after having received
its private demand information, can send a message âi about ai, whereby it is not
confirmed to the truth.
The maximization of the expected profit
Eiπi = si(ai − si + kEi(sj)) , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j ,
leads the reaction functions
si = (ai + kE
i(sj))/2 , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j .
From the viewpoint of the other firm, which does not know the realization of the
rival’s demand parameter, the expected strategy of the rival is
Ei(sj) = (E
i(aj|âj) + kEj(si|âi))/2 , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j .
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Inserting these expressions into the reaction functions gives
si = (2ai + kE
i(aj|âj) + k2Ej(si|âi))/4 , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j . (4)
Since the profit function is quadratic, we can use Radner’s (1962) approach and
assume the linear solution equations
si = ξ1ai + ξ2E
j(ai|âi) + ξ3Ei(aj|âj)
implying that
Ej(si|âi) = (ξ1 + ξ2)Ej(ai|âi) + ξ3Ei(aj|âj) .
Using (4), we equate the coefficients to find ξ1 = 1/2, ξ2 = k
2/(8 − 2k2), and
ξ3 = k/(4 − k2) and, hence, derive the solution equations
si =
(4 − k2)ai + k2Ej(ai|âi) + 2kEi(aj|âj)
2(4 − k2) , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j .
The expected profits are therefore
Eiπi =
[(4 − k2)ai + k2Ej(ai|âi) + 2kEi(aj |âj)]2
4(4 − k2)2 , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j . (5)
Proposition 2: Without a costly signaling mechanism, firms have no incentive to send
true messages about their private demand information. Instead, each firms has an
incentive to signal the highest possible value of its demand parameter.




(4 − k2)k2ai + 2k3Ei(aj |âj) + k4Ej(ai|âi)
2(4 − k2)
is positive for all a1, a2, E
1(a2|â2), E2(a1|â1), given our assumption that 2a+ka > 0.
This implies that each firm has an incentive to signal the highest possible value of
its demand parameter. Since these signals are certainly not credible, rivals will not
react on them. What is needed for a truth-telling perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a
mechanism design that implements revelation of the private information.
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4 A Simultaneous Signaling Mechanism Implementing Truth-
Telling
In this section, we derive a signaling mechanism that indeed implements truth-telling
behavior of both firms. The mechanism involves consistent beliefs of each firm about
the rival’s behavior. In the resulting sequentially rational equilibrium, truth-telling
is not an ad hoc assumption as in the predecessor models of information sharing but
a consequence of an incentive-compatible device, whereby it is in the best interest
of the firms to send true messages.
In the first stage of the game, each firm receives private demand information. When
sending a signal in the second stage, each firm has to take into account the im-
plications in the third stage. It is clear from Proposition 2 that each firm has an
incentive to convince the rival that its demand parameter ai has the highest possible
realization a. This implies that in order to induce the firm to send the truthful lower
message, it must incur other cost when announcing high demand. Adopting the pro-
cedure suggested by Ziv (1993), we therefore introduce a costly signaling mechanism
for firms to send a message about the realization of their demand parameter.
We therefore define the cost function f(âi) indicating the amount of money that
firm i has to pay when sending the message âi. This spending can be observed in
dissipative advertising and charity expenses, among others.2 The introduction of a
costly signaling device defines a signaling game where the cost f(âi) of sending the
message is the signaling cost. Of course, a firm does not have to send an explicit
message at all. But if this strategy is interpreted as the worst possible case, such
behavior will be dominated by sending the true signal.
By accounting for the signal cost f(âi) when sending the message âi the expected
net profits (5) extend to
Eifπ
i =
[(4 − k2)ai + k2Ej(ai|âi) + 2kEi(aj|âj)]2
4(4 − k2)2 − f(âi) , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j . (6)
We characterize a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the costly mes-
sage serves as a signal of the demand parameter. Let Ej(ai|âi) be the belief of firm j
2 As an alternative, rather than burning money, rivals may exchange transfer payments, thereby
reducing net signaling cost.
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that relates firm i’s message âi to its demand parameter ai. Thus, if firm i sends the
message âi (or the signal f(âi), respectively), then it is inferred to have the demand
parameter Ej(ai|âi) ∈ [a, a]. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires that for each
firm i the expected profit (6) is maximized with respect to the message âi. In ad-
dition to these incentive compatibility constraints, firms’ beliefs must be consistent
with the equilibrium play, that is, Ej(ai|âi) = ai. It its straightforward to derive the
incentive-compatible signal-cost function in the perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Proposition 3: In the separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium the signal-cost func-
tions are determined by
f(âi) =
[k2(â2i − a2) + k3(âi − a)E(a)]
(4 − k2)2 > 0 i = 1, 2 , ∀ |k| ∈ (0, 1].




(4 − k2)k2ai + 2k3Ei(aj |âj) + k4Ej(ai|âi)






In order to induce consistent beliefs, these conditions must be fulfilled at âi = ai,
implying Ej(ai|âi) = ai and, hence, dE
j(ai|âi)
dâi
= 1. Since the information transfer is
assumed to be simultaneous, firm i does not know aj when sending its signal, so that







(4 − k2)2 , i = 1, 2 .
Integrating and inserting the initial conditions f(a) = 0 leads to the equilibrium
signal-cost functions
f(âi) =
[k2(â2i − a2) + k3(âi − a)E(a)]
(4 − k2)2 , i = 1, 2 , (7)
which are positive for all |k| ∈ (0, 1], given our assumption that 2a + ka > 0.
Thus, each firm invests a positive amount of money as long as it receives a demand
realization higher than the worst one, i.e. ai > a.
If firms agree to implement the derived signaling mechanism, information sharing
results as a feature of the equilibrium strategy. Each firm reveals its private demand
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information because this behavior maximizes its expected profit. Consequently, the
firms’ messages are credible and taken into account when setting quantities or prices
in the last stage. A crucial condition for the firms to implement the signaling device
is, however, that the expected signal costs do not overcompensate the expected gross
gains from a truthful information exchange.
5 Conditions for Implementing the Signaling Device
Whether firms will reach an agreement to implement the proposed signaling device
depends on whether the expected gross gains from information sharing exceed the
expected signaling cost. Having solved for the signaling-cost functions, it is straight-
forward to derive this net gain.
Proposition 4: The expected gross gains from information sharing exceed the ex-
pected signaling cost if and only if
(12 − k2)k2V (a) − 4k2((E(a2) − a2) + k(E(a))2 − aE(a))
4(4 − k2)2 > 0 . (8)
Proof: In the separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium the expected value of the
signaling cost as given in (7) is
Ef(a) =
[k2(E(a2) − a2) + k3(E(a) − a)E(a)]
(4 − k2)2 .
Using the expression for ∆ in (3), we derive the expected net gains from signaling
true demand information as
∆ − Ef(a) = (12 − k
2)k2V (a) − 4k2((E(a2) − a2) + k(E(a))2 − aE(a))
4(4 − k2)2 .
Thus, whether truthful information signaling will occur or not, decisively depends
on the degree of product differentiation as well as on the first two moments of the
distribution function of the demand variables.
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In order to make sharper predictions we present a parametric example for k ∈ (0, 1],
including the important case of price competition in heterogeneous markets. There-
fore, we assume that a = 0, a → ∞ and use the rather general gamma distribution.3
The gamma distribution seems to be an appropriate example for the description of
demand uncertainty since it is nonnegative and is skewed to the right, i.e. to the









on the support [0,∞] with the shape parameter m > 0 and the inverse scale param-
eter n > 0. The gamma distribution has mean E(a) = m/n, variance V (a) = m/n2,
and skewness S(a) = 2/
√
m.
Proposition 5: In case of the gamma distribution, the expected gross gains from true
signaling exceed the expected cost of signaling only if the skewness of the distribution
is sufficiently large (small values of m) and the products are sufficiently differentiated
(small values of k).






Figure 1 illustrates the region in the parameter space (k,m) where the condition
for expected profitability of the information sharing device by costly signaling is
fulfilled.
Since k is restricted to the interval (0, 1] in this example, the inequality (9) is always
fulfilled if m ≤ 7/8, but it is never fulfilled if m > 2. For all intermediate values of m
the substituiton parameter k has to be sufficiently small. As an example, in the case
of m = 1, where the gamma distribution degenerates to the exponential distribution
with p.d.f. g(a) = ne−na, k < 2(
√
2 − 1) ≈ 0.83 must hold for (9) to be fulfilled.
3 Ziv (1993) has demonstrated his results by using a binary distribution of the unit cost of produc-
tion. A discrete probability function, however, is not an appropriate example for a mechanism
relying on the revelation of information about continuous random variables.
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Thus, in the standard model of price competition with substitute products - as well as
in the model of quantity competition with complement products -, firms will agree
to implement the proposed signaling device and will reveal their private demand
information by sending true messages, if the products are sufficiently differentiated.
6 Conclusion
The revelation of private demand information rises the expected profits of the com-
petitors in a market, and consequently firms are interested in sharing this private
information. This information exchange, however, cannot be done without a truth-
telling mechanism, since firms could realize even higher gains by claiming to be
larger than they really are. There are at least three channels through which firms
can infer the private demand information of the rivals. The first is the existence of
an outside institution, such as a trade association, which is able to transfer true
information. However, even if such an institution may exist in a regulated envi-
ronment it will hardly emerge in a competitive market. The second channel is an
intertemporal transmission of private demand information. Of course, in a repeated
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game of competition with constant demand parameters, firms can simultaneously
signal their private information by their strategic price and quantity decisions in
previous periods. This paper presented a third channel by introducing a two-sided
signaling mechanism implementing information revelation even in a one-period (but
multi-stage) game. Due to the cost of signaling, firms will agree to apply this mech-
anism only if the expected gains from information sharing exceed the expected cost
of signaling. We proved that this condition is fulfilled if the products are sufficiently
differentiated. Thus, even in the absence of an outside institution and even in a one-
period context, firms can agree to implement a signaling device by which a truthful
exchange of their private demand information is possible.
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